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In this model of North and South economies, growth is driven by Schumpeterian 
R&D and by accumulation of two types of human capital, versatile and specialized. The 
former is school intensive while the latter is on-the-job-training intensive. Growth is 
endogenous and independent of scale effects. South's imitation of existing technology is 
conditional to the distance to the technological frontier. Growth depends on 
technological advances in the quality of available intermediate goods, regardless of the 
origin - innovation or imitation -, and not on comparative advantage in the production of 
final goods. 
By allowing immediate international access of the state-of-the-art intermediate 
goods, trade affects the productive structure in the South, bringing about partial 
convergence to the Northern structure and prices. Nevertheless, even when the countries 
have access to the same technology - either through imitation or trade of intermediate 
goods -, differences in domestic institutions and human capital imply differences in 
productivity. 
In addition, trade induces steady-state effects through the price channel, by which 
the specific types of human capital influence the direction of technological progress. 
The consideration of two types of human capital also allows the study of wage 
inequality effects of trade, as well as the derivation of a Schumpeterian dynamic 
equivalent to the static Stolper-Samuelson factor price equalization result. 
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This paper analyses the economic growth effects of North-South trade in 
intermediate goods that embody technological progress. By North and South we mean 
two countries that differ in levels of productivity, stocks of human capital and R&D 
capacity. 
The North is more productive than the South due to domestic institutions, is 
endowed with a higher initial level of the more productive human capital, and its R&D 
activities result in innovations that improve the quality of products - Schumpeterian 
R&D, as formalized by Aghion and Howitt (1992). The South has a marginal cost 
advantage in the production of goods, and also conducts R&D, but its best results are 
imitations of the North's innovations - as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chaps. 11 
and 12).  
These differences are assumed to have historical roots that are reflected in current 
institutional characteristics. Our main concern is not to explain these differences, but 
rather to take them as given at time zero and analyze the subsequent path of both 
economies under international trade. 
We aim at improving our understanding of the dynamic mechanisms that underlie 
the process of North-South technological transmission, following the line previously 
explored by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), but with a substantive difference. It does 
not make much sense to think of international transfer of knowledge, or imitation, 
without the vehicle of international trade. Hence, we want to understand more clearly 
how international trade of goods alone (ie without international mobility of production 
factors) affects the structure and the dynamics of technological transfer, thereby 
influencing the levels and growth rates of the economies. 
In order to pursue this objective, we first characterize (in a stylized model form) 
the domestic North and South economies, in such a way that the productivity, human 
capital and R&D differences become apparent and central to the subsequent analysis. 
In addition to Schumpeterian R&D, we consider that economic growth is also 
driven by endogenous accumulation of two types of human capital, versatile and 
specialized. We think of the former as being school intensive while the latter is on-the-
job-training intensive. The importance of considering both modes of human capital 
formation has been suggested by Lucas (1993) in order to improve his own Lucas 
  1(1988) model. Moreover, in the context of international trade it is useful to consider 
factor endowments, factor price movements and income inequality effects. 
Since we want to focus on technological transfer through trade of intermediate 
goods, it seems reasonable to consider that the South is not too backward relative to the 
North. The degree of backwardness is included by making the South's imitation of 
existing technology conditional to the distance to the technological frontier, in the sense 
that there is a threshold distance beyond which the cost of imitation is higher than the 
cost of re-inventing older product qualities. 
An important feature of the stylized North and South economies is that growth is 
independent of scale effects. Apart from the endogenous growth debate on the subject - 
e.g., Jones (1995a, b), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), and Howitt (1999) -, we 
regard such independence as mainly instrumental to the isolation of the technology 
transfer effects of international trade. In other words, we aim at understanding the ways 
in which international trade affects technological transfers in contexts where market size 
effects are not important. 
Once the economies are characterized, we analyze the effects of international 
trade in intermediate goods. This is the relevant trade, since we want to underline the 
dynamic growth effects of trade operating through the intermediate goods - where R&D 
is directly applied -, while the effects of trade in final goods are limited to the somewhat 
more traditional (in international trade theory) static level effects. 
Keeping with the tradition of growth and international trade analyses, we are able 
to discuss steady-state results in factor prices. These results may shed some light on 
issues that have been raised and discussed in the context of globalization debates, as is 
the case of potential effects of international trade on wage and international inequality.  
After these introductory remarks, the paper proceeds to characterize the North and 
South economies in section 2. Then, in section 3, international trade in intermediate 
goods is introduced and its level and steady-state growth effects derived. Section 4 
concludes the paper with a tentative assessment of the current state of this research. 
 
2. Modeling the domestic economy 
We characterize the North economy and, in the process, highlight the differences 
to the South. 
  2The economy is composed of two sectors: producers of final goods and producers 
of intermediate goods (IGs). R&D activities are directly connected to the IGs sector, 
where competitive monopolists use the innovative blueprints as inputs - as in Romer 
(1990). 
 
Final goods technology 
Final goods - Y, continuously indexed by n ∈ [0, 1] - are produced in perfect 
competition. Following the Schumpeterian set-up
1 complemented with the recent 
contribution of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we consider that each final good can be 
producible by two technologies, versatile and specialized. The versatile technology uses 
versatile human capital - VH - complemented with a continuum of versatile-specific 
intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, J
VH]. The specialized technology's inputs are 
specialized human capital - SH - complemented with a continuum of specialized-
specific intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, J
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The first and third expressions within square brackets sum up the contributions of 
the two types of IGs to production, while the second and fourth represent the role of the 
specific human capital inputs. Parameter α  ∈ ]0, 1[ is the human capital share in 
production. The term A is a positive exogenous variable representing the level of 
productivity, dependent on the country's domestic institutions (ie non-international trade 
related), namely property rights, tax laws and government services. We consider 
ASouth < ANorth as the only North-South difference in the parameters of the production 
function of final goods.  
The human capital terms include the quantities employed in the production of the 
n
th final good - VHn and SHn - and two types of corrective factors accounting for 
differential productivities. An absolute productivity advantage of versatile over 
specialized human capital is accounted for by the joint parameters vh and sh, assuming 
  3vh≥sh≥1, ie assuming a technological bias in favor of the versatile technology.
2 A 
relative productivity advantage of either type of human capital is captured by the terms 
n and (1-n). The use of these adjustment terms transforms the final goods index n in a 
relevant ordering index: it means that versatile human capital is relatively more 
productive in producing final goods indexed by larger ns, and vice-versa. Since n ∈ 
[0, 1], there is a threshold final good N, endogenously determined, where the switch 
from one technology to the other becomes advantageous, as will become clear below.  
Each of the two intermediate goods terms includes an adjustment for quality that 
reflects a stylized technological change process of the quality ladder type. The size of 
each quality upgrade obtained with each successful research is denoted by q, an 
exogenously determined constant >1. The rungs of the quality ladder are indexed by k, 
with higher ks denoting higher quality. At time 0, the highest quality good in each IGs 
industry has a quality index k=0. At time t the highest quality good produced by 
industry j has a quality index k(j,t|.). The quantity   of the quality rung k 
of the intermediate good j is used, together with its human capital complement, to 
produce Y
) , , ( . | t j k xn
n(t). Hence, for example, 
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VH | t j k x q ,  (2) 
is the quality−adjusted total amount of the versatile-specific intermediate good j, and 
(1−α) is its share in the final good production. 
Because of profit maximizing limit pricing by the monopolists producers of IGs, 
only the highest quality available of each intermediate good is actually used, so that the 
quality-adjusted amount (2) becomes 
  ) , (
) ( VH | t j x q n
VH | t j, k .  (2') 
Taking that into account, the zero profit equilibrium of the (constant returns to 
scale perfectly competitive) producers of final goods yields the demand for each 
intermediate good (highest quality only) by the representative producer of n
th final good, 
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1 As amply divulged by the textbooks of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).  
2 We could think of versatile vs specialized as modern vs traditional technologies. 
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where pn(t) is the price of final good n, p(j,t|.) is the price of intermediate good j, and the 
numeraire is the composite final good. All prices are given for the perfectly competitive 
producers of final goods. 
Plugging (3a) and (3b) into the production function (1), and using only the highest 
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are the aggregate domestic quality indexes, measuring domestic technological 
knowledge. The ratio Q /Q  is the relative productivity of the versatile technology, 
which is an appropriate measure of the versatile−specialized technological bias. 
Equation (4) clearly shows how growth of final production is driven by growth of 
technological knowledge and by human capital accumulation. 
H V J SH J
The prices' numeraire - the composite final good - is obtained by integration over 
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Intermediate goods technology 
Since, by assumption, the production of intermediate goods and R&D is financed 
by the resources saved after consumption of the composite final good, the simplest 
hypothesis is to consider that the production function of IGs is identical to the 
composite final good specified by (6) and (1).
3 Given this convenient simplification, the 
marginal cost - MC - of producing an intermediate good equals the MC of producing the 
composite final good, which, due to perfect competition in the final goods sector, equals 
  5the price of the composite final good (numeraire); in short, MC=1. Thus, the MC of 
producing an intermediate good is independent of its quality level and is identical across 
all domestic industries. 
The manufacture of an intermediate good requires a start−up cost of research in a 
new design. This investment in a blueprint can only be recovered if profits in each date 
are positive for a certain period in the future. This is guaranteed by domestically 
enforced patents, which protect the leader firm’s domestic monopoly of that quality 
good, while at the same time disseminating acquired knowledge to other domestic 
firms. Under these assumptions, knowledge of how to make a good is public (non−rival 
and non−excludable) within a country.  
Since the last innovator in each industry is the only firm legally allowed to 
produce the highest quality intermediate good, it will use pricing to wipe out sales of 
lower quality IGs in its industry. Leader firms in all IGs can choose a price ε - 
arbitrarily small - less than the limit price p=qMC. This limit price reflects the fact that 
the leader in each IGs industry is q times more efficient that the closest follower. Since 
the lowest price the producer of the second best good can charge (without having 
negative profits) is MC, the leader firm can successfully capture the entire market for 
this good by selling at any price slightly below qMC - see, for example, Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, chap. 4). 
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This is a constant mark-up price, which, together with the MC=1 condition 
explained above and the limit price definition, implies that the price of all IGs is the 
same - p -, equal to the mark-up price and to the size of each quality improvement - q.  
 
Equilibrium for given technological knowledge and human capitals 
It is convenient to derive now the domestic equilibrium of the economy, for given 
technological knowledge - Q  and Q  defined by (5) - and stocks of versatile and 
H V J SH J
                                                                                                                                               
3 Or, equivalently, that the composite final good is the input in the production of each intermediate good - 
as in Barro e Sala-i-Martin (1997), for example. 
  6specialized human capital. Then, the endogenous determination of human capital 
accumulation and R&D activities close the model of the domestic economy. 
An important feature of the equilibrium is that only one technology, versatile or 
specialized - ie one combination of IGs of a certain type and the respective human 
capital - is used to produce a particular final good. The derivation of this result follows, 
with the due differences, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).  
The pattern of comparative advantage embedded in the production function (1) 
through the adjustment terms n and 1-n makes VH relatively more productive in high 
indexes final goods. Together with profit maximization, this pattern implies the 
existence of a threshold final good N∈[0,1] such that only specialized technology is 
used to produce final goods indexed by n ≤ N, and only versatile technology is used to 
produce goods with n > N, ie in production function (1), 
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The determination of N follows from equilibrium in the factors markets, by 
equalizing the marginal value product of each type of human capital across the relevant 
final goods industries - n ≤ N for SH and n > N for VH. The resulting N, as a function of 
the currently given variables, is 
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where the index w in the human capital inputs identifies, at each moment in time, the 
VH and SH actually employed in the production of goods, as opposed to VH and SH in 
formation (at school or on-the-job-training, as will be apparent below). 
It is useful to relate N to prices, as well. This is achieved by taking into account 
that in the threshold industry n=N both a firm that uses specialized technology and a 
firm that uses versatile technology should breakeven. This turns out to yield, at each 
moment in time, the following ratio of index prices of goods produced with versatile 
















where prices are, at each period t, conveniently indexed as 
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Equation (9) shows that either if the technology is highly versatile-biased - that is, 
high  - or if there is a large relative supply of VH, the fraction of industries 
using the versatile technology is large and so N is small. In terms of prices, small N 
implies that the relative price of versatile technology goods is also low and, conversely, 
the relative price of specialized technology goods is high, as equation (10) shows. In 
this situation, the demand for specialized-specific IGs is high - equations (3a,b), 
increasing the demand for specialized-specific new designs and inducing R&D activities 
aimed at improving specialized-specific technologies. In sum, the structure of the stock 
of human capital influences the direction of R&D through the final goods price channel 
- there are stronger incentives to develop technologies when the final goods produced 
by these technologies command higher prices.
SH H V J J Q Q /
4 
The equilibrium aggregate output at each time t - the composite final good from 
equation (6) - is expressible as a function of the currently given aggregate domestic 
quality indexes and human capitals, 
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Consumers and human capital accumulation 
In order to account for human capital accumulation and employment, we turn now 
to the individuals in the economy. Population growth is zero and there are many 
heterogeneous consumers, each of them deciding on the allocation of time and income. 
Time is divided between attending the education system to accumulate human capital, 
and working to earn an amount denominated in composite final output, proportional to 
his human capital. Income is partly spent directly on the consumption of the composite 
final good, and partly lent in return for future interest. 
Heterogeneity is present in two related individuals' characteristics. One is ability 
level - a - uniformly distributed over a range [0, 1] and specific to each individual. And 
the other is the type of human capital - VH and SH. For simplicity, we consider an 
                                                 
4 This price channel shows up in various papers by Acemoglu (eg 2002), although always dominated by 
the market size effect, which, in our case, is removed - see below section 3, Equilibrium R&D.  
  8exogenous threshold ability a  such that individuals with high ability - a > a  - 
accumulate the versatile type (more productive, recall), while low ability individuals - 
a ≤ a  - are only able to accumulate the specialized type. Thus, each individual is 
indexed by a, which implicitly also defines the type of his human capital. 
The infinite horizon lifetime utility of an individual with ability a is the integral of 
a discounted CIES utility function, 
  dt t exp
1
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where  c(a,t) is the amount of consumption of the composite final good of the 
individual with ability a, at time t; ρ>0 is the discount rate; and θ>0 is the inverse of 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The individual a budget constraint, at each t, equalizes income earned to 
consumption plus savings. Savings are the accumulation of assets, i.e. lending takes the 
form of ownership of the profitable firms, which are the ones that produce intermediate 
goods in monopolistic competition.
5 Denominating these assets by K and its return by r, 
the budget constraint, expressed as savings = income + consumption, is 
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a a if VH
a a if SH
m ; w
m(t) is the wage per unit of human capital type m at time t; uS(a,t) 
and uT(a,t) are the fractions of time t that individual a spends accumulating human 
capital at school and on-the-job-training (OJT), respectively. Thus, [1−uS(a,t)−uT(a,t)] 
is the fraction of time t that individual a spends at work. Due to arbitrage in the 
domestic assets markets, the interest rate in (14) depends neither on ability nor on the 
type of human capital, only on time. 
In the education system, individuals accumulate human capital of the type VH or 
SH, using as inputs school and OJT in any desired combination. School and OJT, in 
turn, are proportional to the fraction of time allocated to each and to the amount of the 
individual's human capital.
6 We consider the following CES, constant returns, 
accumulation function of type m human capital: 
                                                 
5 The value of these firms, in turn, corresponds to the value of patents in use, as explained below. 
6 This extends Lucas' (1988) schooling model to both schooling and OJT. 
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where δ
m is the depreciation rate of the m type human capital; the expressions within 
square brackets are the factors school(a,t) and OJT(a,t) denoting, respectively, 
schooling activities and OJT of an individual with ability a, at time t;   and   are 
efficiency parameters measuring the intensity of schooling and OJT activities; and 
ϕ
S χ T χ
m∈[0,1] is the distribution parameter, which determines the relative importance of 




SH, such that VH is relatively school intensive and SH is 
relatively OJT intensive,
8 and  T S χ χ ≥ , such that productivity in OJT is not higher than 
in schooling. As to the relationship between the two factors in the accumulation of 
human capital, the CES formulation (15) allows schooling and OJT to be either 
complements or substitutes, depending on the value of the substitution parameter - 
complements if φ < 0 and substitutes if 0< φ ≤1. 
Each consumer solves an optimal control problem of maximization of lifetime 
utility (13) subject to the constraints on the accumulation of assets (14) and human 
capital (15). The controls are c, uS and uT, and the state variables are K and VH or SH. 
The solution for the consumption path, which turns out to be independent of the ability 
and type of human capital, is the Euler equation 
  [] ρ
θ








As for the time-allocation part of the problem, the optimal ratio is independent of 
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When schooling and OJT are substitutes, the optimal time-allocation ratio is 
positively related to the intensity ratio, and vice-versa in the case of complements. It 
makes sense - if schooling and OJT are complements in (15), then an increase in the 
                                                 
7 ϕ
m=1 yields the human capital accumulation function à la Lucas (1988); and when ϕ
m=0, the increase 
in the stock of human capital is only due to OJT. 
8 This is in line with Grossman and Shapiro's (1982) suggestion that school provides general human 
capital, more versatile or adaptable to changing environments, while OJT is more specific. 
  10time allocated to the factor with higher intensity requires a greater increase in the time 
allocated to the lower intensity factor. 
The optimal time-allocation ratios can also be expressed in terms of the given 
wages' dynamics, yielding supply of effort functions for each type of human capital. 

































Probabilities of successful R&D 
In addition to human capital, R&D drives economic growth. A more detailed 
description of the technology of R&D activities is thus in order, closing the 
characterization of the North and South domestic economies. 
R&D activities in the North result in innovative designs for the manufacture of 
intermediate goods, which increase their quality. The designs are domestically patented 
and the leader firm in each IGs industry - the one that produces according to the latest 
patent - uses limit pricing to assure monopoly. The value of the leading-edge patent 
depends on the profit-yields accruing at each period t to the monopolist, and on the 
duration of the monopoly power. The duration, in turn, depends on the probability of a 
new innovation, which creatively destroys the current leading-edge design - in the lines 
of the Schumpeterian models introduced by Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). The probability of a successful innovation is, thus, at the heart of R&D. 
Let  I index the Northern innovator, and   denote the instantaneous 
probability at time t - a Poisson arrival rate - of successful innovation in the next higher 
quality [k(j,t|m)+1] in IGs industry j, which complements human capital type m. 
) , , ( m | t j k pbI
  ) | , , ( ) | ( ) | , , ( ) | , , ( ) , , ( m t j k cp m t lm m t j k lr m t j k rs pb I I I I I m | t j k = ,  (19)
where 
(i) rsI is the flow of domestic final good resources devoted to domestic R&D; 
(ii)   represents learning by R&D, as the positive learning effect 
of accumulated public knowledge from past successful research - see Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, chap. 12). 
) | , ( ) | , , (
m t j k
I I q m t j k lr β =
(iii)   is the adverse effect of market size, capturing the 
idea that the difficulty of introducing new quality IGs and replace old ones is 
, 0 , ) | ( ) | ( > =
−
I I
I w t m m t lm ξ
ξ
  11proportional to the size of the market measured by the respective human capital 
employed. That is, for reasons of simplicity, we reflect in R&D the costs of scale 
increasing, due to coordination among agents, processing of ideas, informational, 
organisational, marketing and transportation costs, as reported by works such as Becker 
and Murphy (1992), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) 
and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999).
9 
(iv)   is the adverse effect - cost of complexity - 
caused by the increasing complexity of quality improvements.
, 0 , ) | , , (
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α
10 
The South mimics the R&D process of the North, but not necessarily at the edge 
of technological progress. That is, South's R&D activities result either in imitation of 
current best qualities or in re-invention of lower rung qualities. Let us focus on the 
former case. Indexing the imitator by P, and denoting the probability of successful 
imitation by   - the instantaneous probability of successful imitation of the 
current higher quality [k(j,t|m)] in IGs industry j,  
) , , ( m | t j k pbP
) | , , ( ) | , , ( ) | ( ) | , , ( ) | , , ( ) , , ( m t j k bp m t j k cp m t lm m t j k lr m t j k rs pb P P P P P P m | t j k = ,  (20)
where 
(i) rsP is the flow of domestic final good resources devoted to domestic R&D; 
(ii)  ;  k k q m t j k lr P I P
m t j k
P P
P ≤ < < = , 0 , ) | , , (
) | , ( β β β
(iii) lm  is the adverse effect of market size;  , 0 , ) | ( ) | ( > =
−
P P
P w t m m t ξ
ξ
(iv)   ie we assume that the complexity cost of 
imitation is lower than the innovation's - as argued by Mansfield et al. (1981) and Teece 
(1977);  
, 0 , ) | , , (
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(v)  [] ( ) (.) exp ) | , ( ) | , ( exp ) | , , ( g m t j IT m t j DP m t j k bpP σ + = , with σ = 0 in autarky and 
> 0 otherwise, is a catching-up term, specific to the imitator, that sums up positive 
effects of imitation capacity and backwardness. 
The first exponential of the catching-up term in (iii) captures two important 
determinants of imitation capacity, domestic policies promoting R&D
11 - index number 
                                                 
9 Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), in particular, provided micro foundations for this effect in a model 
of growth through variety accumulation. 
10 This complexity cost is modelled in such a way that, together with the positive learning effect (ii), 
exactly offsets the positive influence of the quality rung on the profits of each leader IGs firm - calculated 
below in (28); this is the technical reason for the presence of the production function parameter α in the 
expression - see also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chap. 7). 
11 See Aghion et al. (2000 and 2001). 
  12DP - and openness to international trade
12 and other trade policies
13 - index number 
IT = 0 in autarky and > 0 otherwise. 
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where 
(i)  ) ( / ) ( ) ( ~ w | t m w | t m w | t m I P =  is the imitator's relative level of employed m type 
human capital; that is, human capital enhances the imitation capacity - as argued by 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and, more recently, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Aghion 
et al. (2000), for example; 








m | t q = ~  is the relative technological level of the imitator's m-specific IGs;
14 
provided that the gap is not big - ie if q ~ is above threshold d - the term within square 
brackets on the right hand side of (21) reflects an advantage of backwardness - as in 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
When the gap is wider - so that q ~ is below threshold d - backwardness is no 
longer an advantage. In this case, we assume that re-invention of past innovations 
becomes more profitable than imitation.  
 
3. Equilibrium with international trade in intermediate goods 
Once the countries' structure characterized, we proceed now to consider 
international trade of intermediate goods. In this context, the South has access to the 
same technology as the North, either by imitation of the latest innovations, or by 
importing state-of-the art intermediate goods. This improvement in the level of 
technological available to the South is a static benefit of international trade, with 
immediate effects on the levels of productivity and prices of goods and factors. The 
                                                 
12 See, for example Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997). 
13 Namely international integration - see Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap. 11). 
14 The ratio q ~  is a relative average across m-specific IGs, since J
m is the same in both countries and the 
Qs - defined in (5) - are aggregate indexes. 
  13dynamics - growth effect - involves the South as well as the North, due to interaction 
(feedback) between the countries.  
In balanced trade without international mobility of the other factors of production 
and assets, in order to import some IGs, the South has to be able to export other. Due to 
marginal cost advantages, the IGs of which top-qualities are imitated become South's 
exports. This implies that the re-inventor South is out of this trade regime, unless trade 
is extended to final goods. 
 
Worldwide limit pricing 
We must distinguish now between the composite final good of the North, which is 
the international numeraire given by (6), and the Southern one, which we assume 
produced at a lower marginal cost - MCP. Since under perfect competition prices equal 
marginal costs, South's final goods aggregation is 
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where 0 < MCP < MCI = 1 (recall the intermediate goods technology, section 2 above). 
Due to the simplification in technology explained in section 2, this marginal cost 
advantage carries out to the production of intermediate goods. This influences 
worldwide optimizing limit pricing by the relevant competitive monopolists. The three 
possible sequences of successful R&D outcomes and their limit pricing consequences at 
time t, given quality k at time t-dt, are depicted in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Limit pricing of the m-specific intermediate good j 
t-dt t  p(t) 
North produces and exports 
quality k 
North innovates, produces 
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North produces and exports 
quality k 
South imitates, produces and 
exports quality k 
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South produces and exports 
quality k 
North innovates, produces 
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The first mark-up is the one derived above in (7) and is the highest - the Northern 
entrant (I) competes with a Northern incumbent (I), at the same marginal cost (= 1) but 
better quality. The second one is smaller - the Southern entrant (P), with lower marginal 
  14cost, competes in the same quality rung with a Northern incumbent (I). Compared with 
the first, the third mark-up is again smaller, but due to a different reason - the Northern 




The static effect of international trade influencing the South is apparent in the 
equilibrium threshold final good 
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By allowing international access to the state-of-the-art intermediate goods, 
international trade affects the final goods' productive structure in the South - through the 
ratio   - bringing about convergence to the Northern structure and prices - 
which depend on N, equation (10). Since the technological gap is always favourable to 
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15 the South enjoys an 
immediate absolute and relative to the North benefit in terms of aggregate product and 
factor prices - w
m. That is apparent in (12) above, provided that both (i) the 
instantaneous jumps in the allocation of time between employment and human capital 
accumulation, and (ii) the changes in mark-ups, are of second order. In fact, both the 
level of the composite final good, and the marginal productivities of VH and SH 
increase with  . 
Let us suppose that the regime of international trade changes in time t = 0 from 
autarky to free trade of intermediate goods. Also, assume that the technological gap is 
relatively higher in the versatile-specific knowledge, and that initial endowments of 
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These assumptions imply that (the subscript aut denotes autarkic regime) 
                                                 
15 From the definition of the probabilities (19) and (20), the South always lags behind, be it as imitator or 
re-inventor. 
  15  0 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( and ); 0 ( ) 0 ( ; , , , > − > − > > I P aut I aut P P aut P I P N N N N N N N N ,  (25)
ie, the North always produces more final goods with versatile technology than the 
South, although the direction of the immediate level effect is towards convergence in 
the structure of final goods' production.  
In spite of the absolute and relative to the North benefit from the static effect of 
trade to Southern individuals holding either type of human capital, convergence brings 
about an immediate increase in inequality within the South. The shift in the demand for 
VH is more pronounced, due to complementarity between IGs and human capital 




Given the functional forms (19) and (20) of the probabilities of success in R&D, 
which depend on the resources - composite final goods - allocated to it, free-entry 
equilibrium is defined by the equality between expected revenue and resources spent. 
Taking, for example, the case of imitation, such equality takes the form 
  ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( m | t j k rs m | t j k V m | t j k pb P P P = ,  (26)
where V  is the expected current value of the flow of profits to the monopolist 
producer of intermediate good j, or, in other words, the market value of the patent.
) , , ( m | t j k P
16  
This expected flow of profits depends on the amount in each period, on the 
interest rate, and on the expected duration of the flow, which is the expected duration of 
the imitator's technological leadership. Such duration depends on the probability of a 
successful innovation in the North, which is the potential challenger, as shown in the 
third case in table 1.
17 The expression for VP is 
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The amount of profits - ΠP -, at time t, for a j IGs monopolist using an imitation of 
quality  k depends on the marginal cost, the mark-up, and the world demand for 
intermediate good j by the final goods producers. Its expression, for a versatile-specific j 
and recalling that P,I indexes the second sequence in table 1, is  
                                                 
16 Still in other words, V is the value of the monopolist firm, owned by domestic consumers. 
  16() ( )









) ( ) | ( ) ( ) | (
1 ) 1 ( , , | , ,
) | , ( ) 1 (
α α
α α α α
t p A w t VH t p A w t VH






VH t j k
.  (28)
Plugging (28) into (27), and then (27) and (20), with ξP = 1, into (26), and solving 
for pbI, the equilibrium probability of a successful innovation in a versatile-specific 
intermediate good - given the interest rate, the human capitals and the final goods' price 
indexes - is 
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The equilibrium m-specific pbI turns out to be independent of j and k. There are 
two reasons behind this independence. The first and most substantial one is the removal 
of scale of knowledge effects - the positive influence of the quality rung on profits and 
on the learning effect is exactly offset by its influence on the complexity cost [see the 
exponents of q in (28) and in (20)-(ii) and (iv)]. The other is the simplifying assumption 
that the determinants of imitation capacity, DP and IT in the catching-up term in 
(20)-(v), are not specific to each intermediate good. 
Additional scale effects could arise through market size, as has been intensely 
discussed in the R&D endogenous growth literature since Jones' (1995) critique. Due to 
the technological complementarity in the production function (1), in our model the size 
of the market for m-specific intermediate goods is the employed m-type human capital. 
Then, the scale effect is apparent in the size of the profits (28) - see the human capital 
terms within square brackets. Since we aim at understanding international trade effects 
other than market size, the removal of scale is in order. The adverse effect of market 
size due to the scale-proportional difficulty of introducing new quality intermediate 
goods - term (iii) in (19) and (20) - is designed to offset the scale effect on profits. With 
ξ = 1, the offsetting is such that the market size influence becomes negligible, as it is 
apparent in expression D in (29). 
                                                                                                                                               
17 In the case of the value of a patented innovation - VI - the challenge comes from both a new Northern 
innovation and a Southern imitation - ie the first and second cases in table 1. 
  17Since the probability of successful innovation - as a Poisson arrival rate - 
determines the speed of technological progress, equilibrium can be translated into the 
path of Northern knowledge, from which free trade in intermediate goods allows the 
South to benefit as well. The relationship turns out to yield the following expression - 
where (29) is plugged in - for the equilibrium rate of growth of, for example, VH-
specific technological knowledge: 
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It is clear in (30) that there are international trade feedback effects from imitation 
to innovation. That is, the positive level effect from the innovator to the imitator - the 
access to the state-of-the-art intermediate goods increases production and thus the 
resources available to imitation R&D - feeds-back into the innovator, affecting its 
technological knowledge through creative destruction. 
Due to the technological complementarity in the production of final goods, the 
rate of growth of m-specific technological knowledge - (30) for the South and m = VH - 
translates into the growth of demand for m-type human capital interrelated with the 
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Plugging (30) into (31) and equating this m-type human capital demand path to 
the respective supply by individuals - equation (18) - the equilibrium interest rate in the 
South is obtained. By Walras law, this is also the interest rate that clears the assets 
market - savings by individuals equal to the value of the firms. Finally, the general 
equilibrium instantaneous growth rate of the South economy at time t results from 
plugging the equilibrium interest rate into the Euler equation (16). 
 
  18Steady-state growth 
Since, by assumption, both countries have: (i) the same technology of production 
of final goods;
18 (ii) the access - through free trade - to the same state-of-the art 
intermediate goods, and (iii) the same technology of human capital accumulation; then 
the steady-state growth rate must be the same as well. This implies, through Euler 
equation (16), that interest rates are also equalized between countries in steady-state. 
As for the sectorial growth rates, we note that the aggregate resources constraint - 
again in country P, for example - is 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t RS t X t C t Y P P P P + + = ,  (32)
where YP is total resources, the composite final good; CP is aggregate consumption; XP 
is aggregate intermediate goods; and RSP is total resources spent in R&D. In other 
words, the aggregate final good is used for consumption and savings, which in turn are 
allocated between production of intermediate goods and R&D. 
Since the composite final good production is constant returns to scale in the inputs 
Qs and human capitals - see above (12) -, then the constant common steady-state growth 
rate, designated by gr, is 


































) ( & & & & & &
.  (33)
Clearly, steady-state endogenous growth is driven by R&D and human capital 
accumulation. This feature is not, however, specific to the regime of international trade. 
In order to look at the steady-state effects of international trade we must investigate gr 
further. To this end, we compare the steady-state interest rate 
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with the one that would prevail under an autarkic steady-state. Taking into account that 
goods, assets, as well as knowledge do not flow internationally in autarky, only re-
invention is possible in the South. In that case the probability of successful imitation 
(20) collapses into a probability of successful re-invention, where backwardness and 
  19trade effects disappear. The increment in the steady-state interest rate, from autarky to 
trade in intermediate goods and imitation, depends on the difference 
() [] () ( ) ( ) [ ] P P
VH









where   is the autarkic steady-state index price of the final goods produced with 
versatile technology, and all other variables are in steady-state under international trade 
of intermediate goods.  
VH
aut P p ,
While evaluation of (35) requires solving for transitional dynamics through 
calibration and simulation - which is beyond the purpose of this paper -, we can, 
however, emphasize two ways, in addition to the level effects, through which 
international trade influences, in opposite directions, steady-state growth. 
The first is the positive catching-up effect on the probability of successful 
imitation. Imitation capacity increases with the index of openness - IT - and the 
advantages of backwardness are only captured in the presence of international trade - 
σ  >  0. Through the feedback effect described above, the probability of successful 
innovation, and thus the steady-state growth rate, are also affected - see (29) and (30). 
The second - counteracting - channel is the monopolistic competition mark-up. In 
(35) the Southern monopolist's mark-up under international trade is  , clearly 
less than the mark-up in the South under autarky, 
( P MC − 1 )
[ ] P MC − −
−1 ) 1 ( α . This loss of profits 
also happens to the Northern monopolist: the average mark-up between the first and 
third situations in table 1 above is smaller than [ ] 1 ) 1 (
1 − −
− α , which is the mark-up 
under autarky. The reason is that in autarky successful innovations in the North and re-
inventions in the South are protected from each other's international competition. Once 
engaged in international trade and imitation becomes profitable (provided that the 
technological threshold d is overcome), profit margins in both North and South are 
reduced, which disincentives R&D activities.
19  
In addition to the direct international trade effects, expressions (34) and (35) allow 
further comparative steady-state analysis. Table 2 sums up some qualitative results not 
directly related to R&D. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
18 Except for the level of productivity A in (1), which implies differences in the levels but not in the 
growth rates. 
19 Contrary to previous models in which the reduction of margins is offset by market enlargement - eg 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) -, we have removed the scale effect, as explained above. 
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Both countries' exogenous levels of productivity - AI and AP -, affect not only the 
levels, but the growth rate as well, due of the role of competitive monopoly profits. 
International trade emphasizes the importance of improvements in domestic institutions, 
because they turn out to matter not only at home but also abroad. 
As to the human capital production parameters - recall (15) -, the second column 
of table 2 shows that the more intensive is the use - in the production of VH and SH - of 
the more productive mode of human capital production - schooling -, the higher is the 
growth rate. Also, the more substitutes the modes of human capital production are - 
measured by φ -, the higher is the use of the more productive one, thus, again, the higher 
is the growth rate. Productivity in the human capital sector, then propagated to the 
economy, is also improvable directly through χS and χT. In sum, improvements in 
productivity in the human capital sector reduce its opportunity cost and consequently 
increase its accumulation, which, in turn, increases gr. 
 
Steady-state effects 
We come now to the technological implications of steady-state growth in both 
countries, in terms of relative prices of final goods, technological productivities and 
wages. Figure 1 compares the autarkic steady-state paths with the ones resulting from a 
move - at time zero - to free trade of intermediate goods. The figure is arranged in a 
suitable order to accompany the sequence of analytical steps that follows. 
Due to complementarity, the technology threshold and relative prices of final 
goods are determined by the combination of the two types of technological knowledge 
with the respective human capital employed - recall (9) and (10). As results from the 
steady-state relationships in (33), such combination tends to a constant in each country 
and, consequently, so do N and relative prices. Despite the downward level effect in the 
South at time zero (explained above), differences in factor endowments - as assumed by 
(24) - dominate the steady-state, such that relative prices of versatile technology final 
goods are always higher in the South. 
  21Figures 1.1-1.2 also show a consistent drop in the steady-state levels of both N 
and relative prices, from autarky to trade. In fact, due to differences in endowments, the 
time zero (under trade) North-South average relative price of versatile technology final 
goods is higher than in the North alone. Through the price channel - discussed above in 
section 2 - this induces relative demand for versatile-specific new designs, biasing R&D 
in that direction more than in autarky, as shown in both scenarios A and B of figure 1.3. 
Relative to autarky, such steady-state bias increases the worldwide supply of versatile-
specific IGs, thereby lowering in both countries the steady-state relative price of the 
versatile technology final goods and the technological threshold.  
Scenarios A and B in figure 1.3 lead to two alternative steady-state paths for the 
relative productivity of the state-of-the-art versatile technology.
20 While the price effect 
on the technology bias - just described above - operates in both A and B in the same 
direction (diminishing the rate of growth of the relative productivity of the specialized 
technology), in case B the effect is strong enough to revert the bias. This is crucial to the 
steady-state path of relative wages, as expression (31) and figures 1.4-1.5 show. In fact, 
with relative prices of final goods constant, the direction of technology bias is the sole 
determinant of the path of wage inequality. The immediate increase (level effect) in the 
relative wage of VH in the South ends up being reverted in steady-state A, or reinforced 
in steady-state B, depending on the bias in favor of specialized or versatile technology, 
respectively. In any case, the steady-state path of wage inequality, in either direction, is 
always more moderate than in autarky, reflecting the weaker technology bias.  
Figures 1.4-1.5 also depict the maintenance of a wage differential between the 
North and the South. This is to be expected from the conjunction of assumptions of (i) 
international immobility human capital and (ii) differences in productivity and marginal 
costs between the countries. But the steady-state rates of growth of wages are equalized 














































































This can be regarded as a Schumpeterian dynamic equivalent to the static Stolper-
Samuelson result. That is, in spite of international immobility of human capital, the 
  22steady-state growth of wages is common to both countries because they share the same 
technological progress embodied in internationally traded intermediate goods. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper emphasized the mechanisms, other than market size, through which 
international trade brings about North-South transfer of technology. After properly 
designing the probabilities of successful R&D in order to isolate the scale effect, we 
have analyzed a level static effect arising from worldwide access to the state-of-the-art 
intermediate goods, and steady-state effects due to the price channel through which 
specific types of human capital influence the direction of technological progress. The 
consideration of two types of human capital in this set-up allowed the study of wage 
inequality effects of international trade, as well as the derivation of a Schumpeterian 
dynamic equivalent to the static Stolper-Samuelson factor price equalization result. 
Next steps of this research include (i) solving for transitional dynamics through 
calibration and simulation in order to quantify the differences and transition from 
autarky to international trade; (ii) discussing the implications to technological diffusion 
of international intellectual property rights, in addition to the domestic ones already 
considered; and (iii) introducing a general purpose technology with the possibility of 
alternative scenarios of international diffusion. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
20 The path in the South is only shown up to time zero, since its relationship with the dynamics of prices 
and wages is confined to autarky.  
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  26Figure 1. Steady-state under free trade of intermediate goods 
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1.4. Relative wage of the versatile human capital






































1.4. Relative wage of the versatile human capital






































1.5. Relative wage of the versatile human capital






































1.5. Relative wage of the versatile human capital
Case B – increasing inequality
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